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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches 
and seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the person or things to be seized. 
TABLE OF CASES 
AND AUTHORITIES 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution 8,9 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 8,9 
Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 (1979). 9 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) 9 
Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,499 (1983) 11 
..8 
...8 
16 
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S 91 (1990) 10 
Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128,138-39 (1978) 9 
Rios v. United States. 364 U.S. 253,261 (1960) 10 
State v. Bruce, 779 P 2nd. 646, 650 (Utah 1989) 11 
State v. Johnson. 805 P 2d. 761 (Utah 1991) 11 
State v. Mavcock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 11 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P 2nd. 1132,1135 (Utah 1989) 10 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.12d 730 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) rev. on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1992) 9 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20(1968) 11 
United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1994) 11 
United States v. Sowers, 136F.3d24, 27 (1 st Cir. 1998) 10 
U.S. v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) 10 
United States v. Sanchez, 943F.2dU0, 113 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1991)....9 
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code 
Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant challenged the 
stop and further detention of the defendant including a search of her person and her 
property. Defendant alleged that such was a violation of her rights as guaranteed by our 
Constitutions protecting her from unreasonable searches and seizure. The Court ruled 
that she did not have standing to assert such rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I Section 14. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This an appeal from the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to 
suppress. Defendant motioned this Court to suppress evidence herein. 
Defendant asserted that the officer herein conducted an illegal search of the 
defendant, her property, and the automobile of which she was a passenger. The 
Court denied the motion finding the defendant had not standing to assert her 
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court further found that she had abandoned the 
property searched when she left the container in the car when the officer ordered 
her to get out. Defendant entered a 'Sery' plea reserving the right to challenge 
this issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The matter came before the Court on the defendant's motion to suppress. 
No evidence was taken by the Court nor offered by the parties at the motion 
hearing. The Court relied on t h e ' Stipulation of Facts7 signed by parties and the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
The stipulation of facts signed by the defense and the prosecution is 
attached in the addendum. Here it is set out below with references to the 
preliminary page and line to support such findings. The stipulation provides: 
The date of the stop, search and arrest is November 5, 2002 at the hour of10:39 
p.m. The location of the stop is westbound Center Street, Provo, Utah. 
Officer Wolken ofProvo Police stopped the car on the report of an expired 
registration. (T.5 L.9/ T 8 L. 22./T. 5 L. 21) No other criminal behavior was noted. 
(T.ll L. 19) After the initial stop, Officer Wolken detected an odor of alcohol coming 
from the driver's breath. No other indicators of impairment were present excepting the 
odor.(T.9L.4./T.12L.22) 
The defendant was in the front passenger seat of her boyfriend's car. Both driver 
and defendant were over the age of 21. Wolken asked the driver to exit the car to perform 
field sobriety tests. The driver passed the officer's test and the Dili investigation was 
discontinued. (T.6 L.4-8/T.9 L. 20/T. 10 L.2) The defendant remained sitting in the 
passenger seat during these times. 
The officer wanted to check the cars for open containers based on his reported 
detection of an alcohol odor even though the officer knew that both the driver and the 
defendant passenger were over the age of 21. The driver denied open containers being in 
the car. The defendant was not questioned. The defendant passenger was waiting for the 
officer's investigation to be terminated so that she and her boyfriend could be on their 
way. 
The officer could not see any open containers from outside the car. (T.10 L. 19.) 
Driver denied drinking alcohol and denied the presence of alcohol. Yet the officer desired 
to pursue his investigation further and asked for consent to search the car for open 
containers. Driver Kassuhn agreed hut limited to the search for open containers. 
Kassuhn did not consent to either the search of the defendant passenger nor her property. 
The defendant was not approached for consent to search the car, herself nor her property. 
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered, she got out of 
the car but left some of her personal items in the car including a small opaque 'Carmax' 
container. The container was located on the front dash of the car. (T. 6 L. 19. T.6 L. 25.) 
As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car), the officer 
commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque carmax (lip balm) 
container. The officer knew that the container belonged to the defendant passenger. The 
container is approximately Vi inch in diameter and 3A inch in depth. 
At hearing, the officer testified that he knew that the container did not contain 
any open containers. T.13 L. 24. The officer could not see inside the small container and 
could not tell what, if anything, was inside until unscrewing the top and looking inside. 
The officer opens the defendant's small Carmax container and located 
methamphetamine, which is the basis of this charge. 
The officer(s) found no open containers in the car. No evidence was located to 
substantiate the officer's reported detection of alcohol. 
The Court made findings that the officer could not determine the contents 
of the container without unscrewing the lid and looking inside. The Court also 
concluded that the officer knew the container to be the defendants. Both driver 
and passenger were over the age of 21. 
The Court then concluded that the defendant did not have standing to 
object to the search of her own property and that she abandoned the property by 
leaving it behind. This is in contravention to the officer testimony that he commanded 
her to step out of the car. 
The Court's findings are attached in the addendum but can be 
summarized as follows: 
The officer stopped the car for an observed expired registration violation. 
No other criminal violation were noted or suspected. The officer however noted 
an odor of alcohol from the driver's breath. The driver was removed from the car 
and performed field sobriety tests which he passed. Because of the odor, the 
officer wished to search the car for an open container. The driver denied that 
there were any open containers in the car. The Court declined to determined 
that issue as to whether the driver consented to the search since the defendant 
was not the driver and does not have standing to assert that issue. Defendant 
was a passenger in the car and was asked to get out of the car to allow the search 
for open containers. The officer noted a Carmex container approximately V2 inch 
in diameter and 3A inch in depth. It was left on the dashboard. The contents 
could not be opened without unscrewing the lid and looking inside. The officer 
assumed it belonged to the defendant passenger. No containers of alcohol or 
other source for the odor of alcohol were located during the search. Both the 
driver and defendant are over the age of 21. 
Based on the above findings, the Court concluded that the 
defendant, as a passenger did not have standing to assert any objections that the 
driver may have had to search of the car. Further, the Court concluded that when 
the defendant left the car she abandoned the container by leaving it behind. She 
had not reasonable expectation of privacy in the container. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant has standing to assert Fourth Amendment and Article I 
Section 14 rights. She was a passenger in the vehicle that was stopped. She was entitled 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures but yet the officer herein detained her 
to investigation an unparticular zed hunch without justifiable cause. The officer was not 
entitled to search her personal property nor herself and the evidence obtained by such an 
illegal search should be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
The defendant asserts that the arrest /search of the residence by officers herein was 
in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the defendant by the United 
States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be 
seized. 
The balance between the public interest and the individual Constitution 
guaranteed right, personal security and privacy, tilts in favor of freedom from police 
interference. Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 (1979). 
STANDING TO ASSERT FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Although courts occasionally use the term "standing" as a shorthand for this 
status, the real question whether an individual's Fourth Amendment interests are affected 
by official actions. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978); United States v. 
Sanchez, 943 F.2d 110, 113 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1991). Since the decision in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), it has been the law that 
"capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the 
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place. 
The primary interests that the Fourth Amendment protects in this type of 
situation is freedom of movement and a concomitant interest in being insulated from the 
fear and anxiety that frequently accompany a sudden, unexplained stop. Courts have 
generally held that these interests "are personal to all occupants of the vehicle." United 
States v. Kimball, 25F.3dl , 5 (1st Cir. 1994). 
Guests in cars or homes have generally been held to have standing to object. In 
Minnesota v. Olsen, 495_U.S_91 (1990), a guest in a home was found to have standing to 
object to the search of a friend's home. See also State v. Rowe, 806 P.12d 730 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1991) rev. on other grounds, 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992) where similarly a guest had 
standing to object to a search of the home. 
In reference to cars, both drivers and passengers have been found to have 
standing. United States v. Sowers, 136F.3d24, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Even passengers in 
taxicabs have been found to have standing. U.S. v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); 
See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960). Each occupant of a car has a right to 
challenge the propriety of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment 
Standing is asserted based on the occupancy of the car and the search of her 
known personal property found within the car. Here the officer not only continues to 
detain the driver and passenger but the officer searches her individual personal property. 
The container searched is known to be the defendant passenger. She only leaves the car 
upon command of the officer. 
Traffic Stop Limits 
When an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, he may briefly 
detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and 
drivers license. State v. Schlosser, 774 P 2nd. 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). See also 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). United States v. Sandoval 29 F.3d 
537, 539 (10th Cir. 1994). 
It cannot be used as a springboard to justify an extensive search nor to detain the 
driver/occupants further. The length and scope of a detention must be strictly tied to and 
justified by the circumstances, which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1,19-20(1968). 
To justify a further intrusion, a police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences reasonable warrant such an 
intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (1968), State v. Bruce, 779 P 2nd. 646, 650 (Utah 
1989). 
Here, the officer concludes his registration investigation. He advises that he detects 
an odor of alcohol and uses this to justify the further detention for the DUI investigation. 
After some testing at the scene, the officer concludes that the driver is not impaired. He 
then reportedly requested consent to search the car for open containers. This despite the fact 
that driver Kausson advised that no open containers existed. The officer could not see any 
from his position outside the car. Officer Wolken's supposed detection of an odor of 
alcohol since the officer found no evidence justifying this belief Neither alcohol nor 
containers were found in the car. 
In State v. Johnson, 805 P 2d. 761 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court struck 
down a search and detention of a passenger. An officer had noticed a vehicle on the 
highway with faulty brakes. The officer, prior to stopping the vehicle, ran a check on the 
license plate and obtained a name of the registered owner. When the officer stopped the 
vehicle, he asked the driver for her driver's license. The name on the license was not the 
name of the registered owner. The officer also asked for a vehicle registration certificate, 
which the driver was unable to produce. The officer then asked the defendant, who was the 
passenger in the vehicle, for identification reasoning that with no registration, no owner 
present, there was a possibility that the car had been stolen. The defendant denied having a 
driver's license or any identification. The driver did give the officer her name and date of 
birth. 
The officer then returned to his patrol car, ran a license check and an outstanding 
warrants check. The check revealed that the driver had a suspended drivers license and the 
defendant had an outstanding warrant. The officer returned to the vehicle and wrote a 
citation to the driver and arrested the defendant. The defendant was carrying a backpack. 
The search of the backpack incident to the arrest, produced drug paraphernalia, 
amphetamines and Utah Identification. 
The Supreme Court held that the officer's detention of the passenger, beyond what 
was reasonably related in scope to the traffic stop, was not justified to any articulable 
suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime. The Court held that the leap from 
asking the passengers name, date of birth, to running a warrant check on her, severed the 
chain of rational inferences of specific and articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt 
to support as yet inchoate and unparticular suspicion or hunch. 
A case with similar facts is State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. Utah 1996). 
There the officer stopped the van because it had a burned-out rear license plate bulb and 
gave defendant a verbal warning. The defendant fixed the bulb while the officer watched. 
While he was doing so, the officer held his flashlight to light the area for Patefield. Unable 
to remove the old bulb, Patefield went to the passenger's side of the van and opened the 
sliding door to get a toolbox. The officer noted the van packed with food, clothing, 
backpacks, coolers and several twelve-paces of beer. One of the twelve packs had been 
opened and half of its contents were gone. Patefield got his tools and returned to fix the 
bulb. 
The officer noted the smell of alcohol coming from Patefield's breath . The officer 
checked for indications of intoxication and found him not to be under the influence. Yet, 
based on the observing the half empty twelve pack of beer and coupled with the scent of 
beer from Patefield, the officer wanted to search of open beer containers. The van was 
searched finding controlled substances. The defendant sought to suppress the evidence. 
The Court found that the possession of beer in a car is a legal activity, which by and 
of itself does not suggest the presence of open containers. The odor of beer matters nothing 
since the beer could have just as easily been consumed outside the car with the can being 
discard. Based thereon the court found that there was not probable cause to search the car 
and suppressed 
Here the officer wants to detain the driver and defendant based on the odor of 
alcohol. It is not illegal to drink a beer and then to drive. It is not illegal for a person to 
carry beer in the car. It is not illegal for a person to carry empty beer cans in the car. What 
is illegal is the carrying of open containers of alcohol in a car. However, the justification of 
such a belief cannot be founded on the simple odor of alcohol. 
Defendant here argues that the officer lacked any specific and articulable facts to 
justify a further detention and search of the car. In the name of investigating, an officer 
may not carry out a full search of the person or of his automobile or other effects. Florida 
v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). 
And if the officer believes an odor of alcohol to be present, he better find it or 
otherwise the search is not justified. 
CORROBORATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
In State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Court held that the 
plain smell of marijuana coming from the car can establish probable cause but the officer's 
ability to identify the odor is inherently subjective and requires corroboration to establish 
the existence of marijuana. 
The Utah Court followed the holdings of U.S. v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 
1993) holding that corroboration is necessary. 
. . . an officer with an incentive to find evidence of illegal activities and 
to justify his actions when he had searched without consent, we believe 
constitutional rights are endangered if limitations are not imposed. .,.. 
The Utah court agreed. A search based solely on an officer's subjective belief will 
be upheld only when the search corroborates marijuana or its use. In other words, if you are 
going to rely on the odor of a substance to substantiate the search, you better find the source 
of the odor. 
SCOPE OF CONSENT TO SEARCH 
A suspect may limit the scope of the search. See Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649, 
656-7 (1980) where the Court held that consent to search a garage would not authorize 
the search of an adjoining house. U.S. v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1992). 
Further, the expressed object of the search generally defines the scope of a search. 
U.S. v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 (8th Cir. 1993). Here the search was for open 
containers and a not general rummaging throughout the car and particularly small closed 
containers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The officer, after concluding his traffic stop, must allow the person to go 
unless he has reasonable and articulable cause to further detain. If the officer suspects 
criminal activity, the officer must have a reasonable and articulable reason to do so or he 
cannot continue to detain. The odor of alcohol coming from two persons over the age of 
21 is not sufficient. State v. Patefield. 
2. If the officer attempts to camouflage his intent by a subjective noted odor, he 
better find the source. If not, reasonable cause is lacking. State v. Mayfield. 
3. The search for open containers is limited to the areas where open containers 
could be found. It does not authorize the police to look everywhere and particularly not 
small plastic containers. 
4. The consent to search the car by the driver does not authorize the officers to 
search the personal property of the passenger. He needs to limit his search the area and 
objects authorized. 
5. Defendant has standing to object. She is being detained as well as the driver and 
her personal property is being searched. 
The fruits of this illegal search should have been suppressed. 
Dated this 13th day of December, 2002. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff : Ruling on Motion to Suppress 
vs. : Date: March 25,2002 
Lacy Bissegger, : Case Number: 011404652 
Defendant : Division I: Judge James R. Taylor 
This matter came before the Court on March 1, 2002 for hearing on the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Court, ruling from the bench, denied the motion. Counsel for 
the Defendant has prepared and submitted a "Ruling on Motion To Suppress & Findings" which 
has been approved as to form by counsel for the State. The Court is, nevertheless, uncomfortable 
with the articulation of the findings and conclusions in the submitted "Ruling." The Court, 
therefore, makes and enters the following findings and ruling. The Court is sensitive to the desire 
of counsel to include facts deemed crucial to any anticipated appeal and, therefore, will entertain 
any reasonable request to supplement this document. 
Facts 
On November 5, 2001 Provo Police Officer Wolken stopped a car westbound on Center 
Street for the observed violation of expired registration. No other criminal violation was noted 
or suspected before the stop. After the stop, at the driver's window, the officer noted an odor of 
alcohol from the driver's breath. The driver was removed from the car and asked to perform field 
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sobriety tests, which he passed. The officer concluded that there was not a DUI violation at that 
point. Because of the odor, the officer did wish to search the car for an open container of alcohol 
and asked for permission to conduct such a search. The driver denied that there were open 
containers in the car. Although there is a dispute as to whether the driver gave permission, gave 
and then revoked permission, or didn't give permission at all this Court specifically declined to 
determine that issue since the Defendant was not the driver and does not have standing to assert 
that issue. 
The Defendant, who was a passenger in the front right seat of the car, was asked to get 
out of the car to allow the search for open containers. As the Defendant got out of the car the 
officer noticed a small, opaque container (a "Carmex" (brand of lip balm) container approximately 
Vi inch in diameter and 3/4 of an inch in depth) on the dashboard which he hadn't seen before 
when looking in the car. The contents of the container could not be determined without 
unscrewing the lid and looking inside. The officer assumed that the container was connected to 
the Defendant because of where it was and when it had become apparent.. The oflBcer opened the 
container and discovered methamphetamine which is the basis of the charge in this case. No open 
containers of alcohol or other source for the odor of alcohol were located during the search. 
Both the driver and the Defendant were over age 21 at the time. 
Ruling 
This Court concluded that the Defendant, as a passenger, did not have standing to assert 
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any objections the driver may have had to the fact or the scope of the search of his automobile 
The Court concluded that when the Defendant left the vehicle she abandoned the container, if it 
was hers, by leaving it behind In that posture the Court concluded that she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy and, therefore, could not object to the search of the container by the 
officer 
The Defendant's motion to suppress is denied 
Dated this 25th day of March, 2002 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
Page 3 of 4 
SHELDEN R. CARTER (0589) 
HARRIS & CARTER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University, Suite 200 
Provo,Utah 84604-4438 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPT. 
—ooOoo— 
) AGREED STATEMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) OF FACTS RE: SUPPRESSION 
) RULING 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) CASE NO. 011404652 
LACY BISSEGGER ) 
Defendant. ) 
—ooOoo— 
Defendant motioned this Court to suppress evidence herein. Defendant asserted 
that the officers herein conducted an illegal search of the defendant, her property, and the 
automobile of which she was a riding as a passenger. 
The defendant asserts that the arrest/search of the defendant and her property by 
officers herein was in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the 
defendant by the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
The Court's ruling is based on the following findings: 
The date of the stop, search and arrest is November 5, 2001 at the hour of 10:39 
p.m. The location of the stop is westbound Center Street, Provo, Utah. 
1 
Officer Wolken of Provo Police stopped the car on the report of an expired 
registration. No other criminal behavior was noted. After the initial stop, Officer 
Wolken detected an odor of alcohol coming from the driver's breath. No other indicators 
of impairment were present excepting the odor. 
The defendant was in the front passenger seat of her boyfriend's car. Both driver 
and defendant were over the age of 21. Wolken asked the driver to exit the car to perform 
field sobriety tests. The driver passed the officer's test and the DUI investigation was 
discontinued. The defendant remained sitting in the passenger seat during these times. 
The officer wanted to check the cars for open containers based on his reported 
detection of an alcohol odor even though the officer knew that both the driver and the 
defendant passenger were over the age of 21. The driver denied open containers being in 
the car. The defendant was not questioned. The defendant passenger was waiting for the 
officer's investigation to be terminated so that she and her boyfriend could be on their 
way. 
The officer could not see any open containers from outside the car. Driver denied 
drinking alcohol and denied the presence of alcohol. Yet the officer desired to pursue his 
investigation further and asked for consent to search the car for open containers. Driver 
Kassuhn agreed but limited to the search for open containers. Kassuhn did not consent to 
either the search of the defendant passenger nor her property. The defendant was not 
approached for consent to search the car, herself nor her property. 
The officer ordered defendant out of the car. Upon being so ordered, she got out 
of the car but left some of her personal items in the car including a small opaque 'carmax' 
container. The container was located on the front dash of the car. 
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As the defendant exited the car (the driver being already out of the car), the officer 
commenced his search. However, the officer looked into a small opaque carmax (lip 
balm) container. The officer knew that the container belonged to the defendant 
passenger. The container is approximately Vi inch in diameter and 3A inch in depth. 
At hearing, the officer testified that he knew that the container did not contain any 
open containers. The officer could not see inside the small container and could not tell 
what, if anything, was inside until unscrewing the top and looking inside. 
The officer opens the defendant's small carmax container and located 
methamphetamine, which is the basis of this charge. 
The officer(s) found no open containers in the car. No evidence was located to 
substantiate the officer's reported detection of alcohol. 
Dated this day of July, 2002. 
Approved: 
David Clark 
Utah County Attorney Office 
Attorney for Defendant 
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